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WHAT'S GOOD FOR THE GOOSE IS NOT GOOD
FOR THE GANDER: SARBANES-OXLEY-STYLE
NONPROFIT REFORMS
Lumen N. Mulligan*

In this Article, I contend that the Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired nonprofit reforms currently being put forward in seven states, particularly the costly
disclosure requirements, will be of little value in the effort to improve ethical nonprofit board governance. After providing a primer on the oversight
of nonprofit organizations and highlighting the unique difficulties facing
the nonprofit sector the Article reviews the recent Sarbanes-Oxley-like
nonprfit reforms introducedin seven states. It then contends that the disclosure-focused reforms that form the bulwark of these initiatives will not
foster improved ethical nonprofit board governance. It also argues that this
failure stems from the inappropriate application of a stockholder-based
normative perspective in the nonprofit sector The Article concludes by
noting that appropriatinga normative construct more tailored to the nonprofit community, namely stakeholder theory, is essential to drafting
effective nonprofit sector reforms in the future.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States boasts the largest nonprofit sector in the world, and
that sector continues to grow.' The Internal Revenue Service, the primary
federal regulator of nonprofit organizations, 2 currently oversees 1.6 million
tax-exempt organizations holding $2.4 trillion in assets.3 Unfortunately, this
huge sector of the economy recently has been pummeled with a spate of
now all-too-familiar corporate scandals.4 In the seven years preceding 2002,
officers and directors of major charitable organizations misappropriated at
least $1.28 billion from 152 nonprofit organizations.5 To make matters
worse, a recent Chronicle of Philanthropy study contends that this figure,
which is based upon newspaper reports, significantly underestimates the
scope of abuses within the nonprofit community. 6 Congress responded to
similar misdeeds in the for-profit sector with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
imposes, inter alia, a series of disclosure, corporate governance, and auditing requirements upon enumerated, publicly traded corporations. But, with
the notable exceptions of the whistleblower and document-retention provisions, Sarbanes-Oxley does not apply to nonprofit corporations."

1. Stephanie Strom, Accountability; New Equationfor Charities:More Money, Less Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17 2003, at Fl.
2.

See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL

AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION

238-41 (2004).

3. See Internal Revenue Service, Tax Exempt & Government Entities Division At-a-Glance,
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/O,,id=100971,00.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (providing listing of
services for exempt organizations).
4. See, e.g., James J. Fishman, Improving CharitableAccountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218,
219 n. 1 (2003) (providing examples of recent scandals involving nonprofit organizations).
5. Brad Wolverton, Study: Charity Fraud Exceeds $1-Billion, CHRON.
Nov. 27, 2003, at 26.
6.

PHILANTHROPY,

Id.

7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2003)).
8. Sarbanes-Oxley, as a general rule, regulates the SEC, issuers of securities that register
with the SEC, and professionals (e.g., lawyers and accountants) who work with securities issuers.
See generally id. § 203 (regulating accountants); id. § 301 (regulating issuers of securities); id. § 307
(regulating attorneys). Nonprofit corporations, by contrast, are subject to a "nondistribution constraint," meaning they may not pay out net profits to shareholders or the like. See, e.g., REVISED
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 13.01, 1.40 (1987); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit

Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) (providing the definitive discussion of the "nondistribution constraint"). As such, they cannot issue securities and do not generally fall under the scope of
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Nevertheless, the recent incidents of nonprofit malfeasance have not escaped state legislative notice. This attention has spawned a host of SarbanesOxley-like proposals for nonprofit organizations, which are the focus of this
Article. Immediately following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the New
York Legislature led the way by taking up a wide-ranging bill, championed

by the state attorney general, that would mandate Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms for the nonprofit sector.9 The Massachusetts attorney general soon
proposed his own bill similar to New York's.'0 Neither bill passed. Numerous other states have followed suit by introducing comparable SarbanesOxley-like bills that ultimately failed to pass." Several states, however, have

passed acts codifying some Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms for nonprofit organizations--California's Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 being, perhaps,
the most well-known. The unifying theme of these Sarbanes-Oxleyinspired bills is their reliance upon disclosure mechanisms (e.g., officercertified financial statements), governance mandates (e.g., audit committees), and auditing requirements (e.g.,
independent audits performed by
3
CPAs) to induce corporate integrity.
In this Article, I contend that these state reforms, particularly the costly
disclosure requirements, will be of little value in the effort to improve nonprofit governance. 4 The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a primer
on the oversight of nonprofit organizations. Part II reviews the recent Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms introduced in seven states. Part III
Sarbanes-Oxley. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 244 (2004).
9. See S.B. 4836-A, 2003 Leg., 226th Gen. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). This bill was substantially
amended. S.B. 4836-B, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. (N.Y. 2003). The legislature has yet to pass this bill.
See Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought To Be A Law: The Disclosure Focus Of Recent Legislative
Proposals For Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 562--64 (2005) (outlining the legislative history of the New York bill); Brackman Reiser, supra note 8, at 244-48 (same).
10.
Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, An Act to Promote the Financial Integrity of Public Charities, http://www.ago.state.ma.us/filelibrary/FinanciallntegrityPublic
Charities.rtf (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Mass. A.G. Proposal].
11.
See, e.g., S.B. 1115, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2004); H.B. 514, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Miss. 2004); H.B. 724, Adjourned Sess. Of 2003-2004 Biennium (Vt. 2004); S.B. 153, 125th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003); H.B. 1019, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003). The U.S.
Senate, spearheaded by Senator Grassley, has also considered Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit legislation, which is beyond the scope of this Article. See CARE Act of 2003, S.B. 476, 108th Cong.
(2003); see also PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE

NONPROFIT SECTOR (2005), http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel-Final-Report.pdf (providing
a sweeping series of federal reforms upon request of the Senate Finance Committee).
12.
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17510.5 (West Supp. 2006); CAL. GOV'T. CODE
12581-12599.7; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-190b, c, f, h (West Supp. 2006); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-1763, 17-6002 (Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 5004 (Supp. 2005); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:281I-a to -b (Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 12-4-14 (LexisNexis 2004)
(applying only to recipients of state grants).

§§

13.
See Brakman Reiser, supranote 9, at 562-66, 568, 573; Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at
208-09, 268.
14.
This Article will limit its scope to issues of board governance. The exclusion of issues
directly involving nonprofit managers is a function of limited space in this symposium edition, not a
perceived lack of importance of managers.
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contends that the disclosure-focused reforms, which form the bulwark of

these bills, will not foster ethical nonprofit board governance. Part IV argues
that this failure stems from the inappropriate application of a stockholderbased normative perspective in the nonprofit sector. The Article concludes

by noting that appropriating a normative construct more tailored to the nonprofit community, namely stakeholder theory, is essential to drafting
effective nonprofit sector reforms in the future.
1. PRIMER ON NONPROFIT CORPORATE OVERSIGHT

The nonprofit corporation, with 501(c)(3) public charity tax-exempt5
status, is the predominant organizational form for nonprofit organizations.
These organizations constitute the focus of this Article. The recently introduced, state-based, Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms that attempt to affect the
governance of these nonprofit corporations are best understood against the
backdrop of the current state of nonprofit board governance and regulation.

While many of these features will be familiar to lawyers who work in the
for-profit corporate sector, there are numerous factors unique to the nonprofit sector that significantly affect nonprofit board governance and the
regulation of nonprofits by third parties and governmental authorities.
A. Board of DirectorsOversight of Nonprofit Corporations
The legal principles that frame for-profit board governance generally
apply to nonprofit corporations.16 As with for-profit corporations, nonprofit
corporations are governed by a board of directors.'7 As with for-profit corporations, the board must monitor management, make decisions regarding the
high-level direction of the organization, and approve its major transactions.'S
Again, like for-profit directors, nonprofit directors are subject to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, which are applied by the courts with the same
rigor (or lack thereof) as is done in the for-profit context.' 9

15. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 116 (explaining that in the United States today the
nonprofit corporation is the main form of charitable organization). Of the 1.6 million IRS-registered
tax-exempt organizations, 1.05 million are organized as 501(c)(3) organizations, which includes
both public charities and private foundations (the overwhelming majority of whom are public charities). See GIVING USA FOUND., GIVING USA 2006: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR
THE YEAR 2005, at 55.

16. See, e.g., Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 504
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) ("[P]rinciples of law governing for profit corporations generally govern the
activities of a nonprofit corporation...."); JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 63 (2d ed. 2000).
17.

See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1987) (requiring a board of

directors and listing its powers, duties, standards of conduct, etc.).
18. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of Internally
UndemocraticNonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 835 (2003).
19. See Fishman, supra note 4, at 232-39; Harvey J. Goldschmid, The FiduciaryDuties of
Nonprofit Directorsand Officers: Paradoxes,Problems, and ProposedReforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631,
644 (1998); see also REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30; Denise Ping Lee, Note, The
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Nonprofit directors have a unique legal fiduciary duty as well. Specifically, nonprofit directors have a duty of obedience to the mission of the
nonprofit organization. 20 As one court put it, "nonprofit directors ...must be
'principally concerned about the effective performance of the nonprofit's
mission.'''
In addition to this duty of obedience to the mission, several

other key features of nonprofit corporations differentiate them from their
for-profit cousins and significantly affect nonprofit board governance.

First, and most important, nonprofit organizations are subject to a nondistributional constraint. That is to say, nonprofit organizations may earn net
profits, but they may not distribute these profits to persons who exercise
control over the organization (i.e. directors, officers, employees, and other
members of the organization)." This nondistributional constraint has wideranging implications for board governance, not the least of which is the lack
of a commonly accepted metric of performance.23 Because nonprofit organi-

zations lack the sort of financial indicators that provide a measure of success
in the for-profit context, nonprofit directors often face considerable difficulty evaluating the performance of their own organizations. 24 Further, this
inability to distribute profits stymies the creation of market-based regulatory
regimes like those found in the for-profit sector.25

Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect Nonprofit Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 935-45
(2003) (outlining the application of the business judgment rule for nonprofit directors).
20.

FISHMAN

& SCHWARZ, supra note 16, at 230-32; Brakman Reiser, supra note 18, at 837.

21. Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 504 (quoting Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of
Nonprofit Directorsand Officers: Paradoxes, Problems,and ProposedReforms, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L.
631, 641 (1998)); see also Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359,365 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977); Brown v. Mem'l Nat'l Home Found., 329 P.2d 118, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); Att'y
Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Mass. 1986); Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat
Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.YS.2d 575, 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) ("[T]he duty of obedience ... mandates that a [nonprofit] Board, in the first instance, seek to preserve its original mission.").
22. See generally REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 13.01, 1.40(10) (prohibiting
distribution of net profits to insiders); Brakman Reiser, supra note 18, at 833-34 (discussing the
nondistributional constraint); Hansmann, supra note 8, at 838 (providing the definitive discussion of
this concept).
23. See, e.g., Judith L. Miller, The Board as a Monitor of OrganizationalActivity: The Applicability of Agency Theory to Nonprofit Boards, 12 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 429, 433
(2002); Katherine O'Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does The StructureAnd Composition Of The Board
Matter? The Case Of Nonprofit Organizations,21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 206 (2005). Of course,
financial performance is not the sole measure of for-profit performance either. See, e.g., JOHN
ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS

WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BoTroM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS

(1998) (introducing the notion of a "triple bottom line" by which corporate performance is governed
by its environmental and social impacts in addition to its financial success). But see Wayne Norman
& Chris MacDonald, Getting to the Bottom of "Triple Bottom Line," 14 Bus. ETHICS Q. 243 (2004)
(critiquing the triple bottom line concept).
24.

See generally RICHARD P. CHAIT ET AL., IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNING

(1996) (finding that university board members had difficulty evaluating the success of their
schools in achieving their missions).

BOARDS

25. See generally Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIs. L. REV. 227 (describing this problem and proposing the "artificial" creation
of a market to regulate nonprofit organizations which would be required by founders of nonprofits
and large donor organizations).
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Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 105:1981

Second, while it is possible for nonprofit corporations to have members
with voting rights-persons who would hold similar rights and duties as

shareholders in a for-profit corporation-the overwhelming majority of
nonprofit corporations do not have voting members. 16 As a result, most nonprofit boards are self-perpetuating-new members of the board are
appointed by the board itself.17 This affects board governance in several di-

mensions. Most dramatically, the lack of voting members significantly
contributes to an accountability vacuum that plagues nonprofit boards. 28 A
recent study by Professor Judith L. Miller, for instance, found that nonprofit
board members had difficulty identifying any group to whom they were accountable. 29 This lack of accountability to shareholders (or anyone else)

leads nonprofit boards to explain their conduct to a broad range of constituents who often have competing agendas (e.g., donors, governmental
authorities, clients, and staff). These competing constituencies often push

nonprofit corporations to seek differing goals. As nonprofit corporations
accommodate these constituencies, articulating and striving toward a coher-

ent mission becomes more difficult."
Third, the lack of both a clear performance metric and board account-

ability, combined with other factors, has led most nonprofit scholars to note
that the role of the nonprofit director is more complex than that of for-profit
32

board members. Yet the task of nonprofit director is predominantly performed by volunteers3" who spend significantly less time at the task than

their for-profit counterparts. 3 Again, this has ramifications for board gov26. Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the Right of
Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 860 (2002) ("T]he typical nonprofit organization is a
corporation that lacks members with power to vote for the board or on policy issues ....
");Manne,
supra note 25, at 250 ("Charitable nonprofits, however, rarely have members.").
27. Brakman Reiser, supra note 18, at 830 ("Today, self-perpetuating boards are the norm
and members are rare, particularly among charitable or public benefit nonprofits.").
28. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAx-ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES (2002); Evelyn Brody,
Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (1996); Mary Frances Budig et al., Pledges to
Nonprofit Organizations:Are They Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced?, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 47,
108 (1992); Fishman, supra note 4, passim; Miller, supra note 23, at 439-42.
29.

Miller, supra note 23, at 439-42.

30. Id. at 442 ("Nonprofit boards are answerable to multiple constituencies with differing
expectations ....
");O'Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 206.
31.

See O'Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 205-06.

32. See, e.g., id. at 206-07; Goldschmid, supra note 19, at 632; Wendy K. Szymanski, An
Allegory of Good (and Bad) Governance:Applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit Organizations, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1303, 1317.
33. O'Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 215; Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1316; David W.
Barrett, Note, A Callfor More Lenient DirectorLiability Standardsfor Small, CharitableNonprofit
Corporations,71 IND. L.J. 967, 970 (1996).
34. O'Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 212 ("In this sample, the mean percent of board
meetings attended was 71%; this is low relative to the corporate setting, in which any director of a
public company who attends less than 75% of board meetings must be reported in the annual report
to shareholders. Similarly the estimate by board members of an average of forty-two hours per year
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ernance. For instance, nonprofit directors typically lack sufficient information to make informed decisions.35 This inability to invest directors' time
into making informed decisions is exacerbated by the informal, yet ubiquitous, requirement that nonprofit directors do much more than oversee
managers. "The common folklore is that board members should bring to an
organization the three W's: wealth (donations and fundraising), wisdom
(monitoring and oversight), and work (operational duties), a much broader
set of responsibilities than with for-profit boards. 36 Due in large part to the
demands for wealth and work from members of the board, nonprofits tend to
have larger boards than for-profit corporations, which in turn affects board

performance as larger nonprofit board size correlates with less formal oversight of management.37

Fourth, given that most nonprofit directors sit on large, volunteerdominated boards that lack concrete measures of success or lines of accountability, it should be no surprise that directors rely heavily on staff.

Miller's empirical findings corroborate this phenomenon. Nonprofit board
members, she found, often rely exclusively on staff to provide them with
information they need to vote on policy initiatives." Miller also found that
nonprofit board members rubberstamp management's proposals without
debating the effect those proposals would have on the organization. 9 Miller

further found that even when circumstances appeared to mandate a more
diligent oversight regime, boards frequently defer to staff and the chief executive officer.40 In a recent study, Professor Edward Glaeser confirmed
Miller's findings that nonprofit organizations are often "captured" by their
staff and tend to evolve towards "worker cooperatives," especially as the net
worth of the organization increases.4' Other empirical studies also confirm
that "[I]arge or small, most voluntary agencies are unusually dependent on

the quality of their executive leadership, and therefore, more subject to idiosyncratic rather than structural factors., 42 Furthermore, nonprofit managers
spent on board activity is low relative to a recent survey suggesting that outside corporate directors
spend an average of 157 hours per year on board matters." (citation omitted)).
35.
Katherine O'Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does Government Funding Alter Nonprofit
Governance?, 21 J. PoCY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 359, 361 (2002); O'Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at
215.
36. O'Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 207; see also Miller, supra note 23, at 430 ("These
behaviors and activities [expected from nonprofit boards] include things such as determining the
organization's mission and purpose; selecting, supporting, and evaluating the chief executive; engaging in strategic planning; monitoring programs and services; providing sound financial management;
advancing the organization's public image; raising money; and assuring that the organization fulfills
legal and ethical requirements." (citation omitted)).
37.

See O'Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 206, 216-19.

38.

Miller, supra note 23, at 438.

39.

See id.

40.

Id.

41. Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction to THE
ward L. Glaeser ed., 2003).
42.

GOVERNANCE OF NONPROFIT

Ftms 1-44 (Ed-

R. M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Personal Social Services, in THE

SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 244 (W.W. Powell ed., 1987).

NONPROFIT
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have come to expect this deference. Nonprofit managers tend to favor less
independent boards and often complain of "meddling" board members.43 In

short, there are few internal mechanisms that foster independent board control of nonprofit corporations.
B. Third-Party Oversight of Nonprofit Corporations

The non-board-based governance mechanisms for nonprofit corporations are also notoriously lax. 44 As noted above, the nonprofit community
lacks an efficient, market-based regulatory regime.45 Furthermore, there is
no existing, effective mechanism for supervision of nonprofits by nongovernmental agencies through the courts. Very few people have standing to sue

nonprofit organizations. 46 In most states, the only nongovernmental entities
who have standing to sue nonprofits for mismanagement or breaches of fiduciary duty are members of the board itself.47 Board members, however,
face significant disincentives that counsel against exercising this power;
these disincentives have severely limited the efficacy of this mechanism of
board supervision.48 Moreover, in most states, donors and recipients, who
would appear to have incentives to seek redress from the courts, lack standing to sue. 49 Finally, even in those few states that allow broader standing, °

this mechanism has not been a successful means of regulating nonprofit
boards.5'
43.

O'Regan & Oster, supranote 23, at 208.

44. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?,23 J. CORP. L. 655, 657 (1998); Fishman, supra note 4, at 268--69; Henry B.
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 606-07 (1981); Dana
Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties, 53 RUTGERs L. REV. 979, 1020-22 (2001).
45.

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

46. See generally Lee, supra note 19, at 933 ("Unlike business corporations, which provide
for shareholder derivative suits, standing for suits against nonprofits is extremely limited, and few
parties are able to sue even if they have legitimate grievances.").
47. See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L.
REV. 37, 40-42 (1993).
48. See, e.g., Garry W. Jenkins, The Powerful Possibilitiesof Nonprofit Mergers: Supporting
Strategic Consolidation Through Law and Public Policy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1089, 1120 (2001)
("Since directors make the organization's decisions, the chances are slim of a dissident director
emerging and willing to take on the onerous task of bringing suit against his or her colleagues.");
James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34
EMORY L.J. 617, 669 (1985) ("While directors of charitable corporations generally have standing to
sue, they rarely bring derivative suits.").
49. See Developments in the Law, Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1578, 1596
(1992) ("[Dlonors to charitable corporations have often been denied the right to enforce the directors' fiduciary duties."); Hansmann, supra note 44, at 607.
50. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5142(a) (West 1990) (granting standing to nonprofit officers); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PRoFIT CORP. LAW § 623(a), 720(b) (McKinney 2005) (granting standing to
members of the nonprofit with five percent voting power); Jenkins, supra note 48, at 1120 (discussing "special interest" standing).
51. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400,
1433 (1998) (discussing Steeneck v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688 (Conn. 1995), which denied
special interest standing to a life trustee of the defendant university, and arguing that the courts are

1989
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C. Governmental Oversight of Nonprofit Corporations

Nonprofit organizations are also subject to both state and federal regulatory authority. 52 At the state level regulatory authority is vested with
attorneys general53 and at the federal level regulatory power is vested with
the IRS.4 Traditionally, state attorneys general devote their resources toward
enforcing fiduciary duties and good governance practices while the IRS fo-

cuses on taxation issues (not the least of which is the maintenance of taxexempt status). 55 These governmental organizations generally engage in two
types of regulatory schemes: ex ante disclosure regimes and ex post enforcement regimes. Neither set of regimes, however, has met with much
success.
The recent legislative focus on Sarbanes-Oxley-like disclosure require-

ments for nonprofits could lead one to believe that nonprofit corporations
are not currently subject to wide-ranging disclosure requirements. Both the
states and the IRS, however, impose disclosure rules upon nonprofit corporations.56 The states subject nonprofit corporations to a series of disclosure

schemes.57 First, most states require annual registration before soliciting8
efforts.
funds and annual financial reports regarding charitable solicitation

Indeed, most state attorneys general believe that the oversight of solicitation
is the most pressing task they face in the realm of nonprofit regulation.59
Second, most state attorneys general require annual reports regarding the
status of the nonprofit's assets. Third, most nonprofit managers, as a matter
not poised to liberalize standing requirements soon); Jaclyn A. Cherry, Update: The Current State of
Nonprofit Director Liability, 37 DuQ. L. REV. 557, 571 (1999) (arguing that because damages in
such suits flow back to the nonprofit corporation itself, there is little incentive to bring derivative
actions); see also Lee, supra note 19, at 935 (discussing the collective action problems facing those
who would seek to sue a nonprofit for breach of fiduciary duties by directors).
supra note 2, at 428.

52.

See

53.

See id. at 301; Brody, supranote 5 1, at 1406.

FREMONT-SMITH,

54. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 238-41 (reviewing section 501 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which confers tax-exempt status upon numerous organizations).
55. Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613, 618
(2005); see also Fishman, supra note 4, 265-67. In recent years, however, there has been a much
greater overlap of responsibilities, with the IRS taking on more regulation of fiduciary duties and
good governance. Silber, supra, at 618.
56.

See, e.g., I MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS,
§§ 1:04, 2:23 (2000) (reviewing disclosure requirements for nonprofit organiza-
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tions).
57.

See Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 250.

58. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12585-12586 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a190b to -190c; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1760 (Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 50045005B (Supp. 2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ 8E-8F (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2006); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:28 (2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAW. §§ 172 to 172-b (McKinney Supp. 2006);
see also The Multi-State Filere Project, The United Registration System, http://
www.multistatefiling.org/#yes.states (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (listing state solicitation regimes
that will accept the multi-state unified registration form).
59.

Brody, supra note 51, at 1405 n.28.

60. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12586(a) (West 2005); N.Y EST.
LAW § 8-1.4(f)(1) (McKinney 2002); PHELAN, supra note 56, §§ 1:04, 2:23.
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of state law, must issue financial and activities reports to their directors annually. 61 Finally, much of this state-required documentation is readily
available to the public online. 62
The IRS also subjects nonprofits to significant disclosure requirements.
Congress recently required that all nonprofits make their IRS Form 990-a
tax-return for exempt organizations-available to the public. 64 The 990 filing
provides substantial amounts of information about each nonprofit organization, including the organization's financial status, expenditures, lobbying
activities, top salaries paid, and self-dealing transactions. 6' Nonprofit organizations must mail copies of these filings to members of the public upon
request. 66 Much more significantly, 990 filings are available to the public
online at www.guidestar.org. 67 Congress hoped that these disclosure re61
quirements would foster public oversight of nonprofit organizations.
Congress's perception of a need for increased public oversight of nonprofits was driven, in large part, by the failings of the ex post enforcement
regime. A key aspect of this failure on both the state and federal level is a
lack of funding. Although the numbers of nonprofit organizations have dramatically increased, as have donations to those organizations, "state and
federal money spent monitoring [nonprofits from 1992 to 2002] remained
flat or declined. ' 69 This is not a new phenomenon. State attorneys general
have historically given limited resources, and a low priority, to nonprofit
enforcement.7 0 The federal government faces a similar lack of funding. In61.

See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 7.01 (d)(1) (1987).

62. For example, both California and New York have searchable databases of state annual
reporting requirements. California Department of Justice, Charities Search, http:// partners.guidestar.org/partners/cadoj/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007); Office of New York State
Attorney General, Charities Bureau Registry Search, http://fairchild.oag.state.ny.us/online-forms/
searchcharities.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007); see also Internet Prospector, State Charities Databases on the Web, http://www.intemet-prospector.org/charities.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007)
(collecting links to state, on-line nonprofit databases accessible to the public).
63. See Ellen W. McVeigh & Eve R. Borenstein, The Changing Accountability Climate and
Resulting Demands for Improved "Fiduciary Capacity" Affecting the World of Public Charities,31
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 119, 120 (2004); Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1311.
64.

I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A) (2000).

65. See Peter Swords, How to Read the IRS Form 990 and Find Out What It Means,
http://www.npccny.org/Form_990/990.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (providing a nontechnical
overview of the 990 Form).
66.

I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(B).

67. The IRS has directly provided GuideStar's sponsors with millions of Form 990 filings.
GuideStar, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.guidestar.org/help/faq-990.jsp#get990s (last
visited Jan. 26, 2007).
68. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, VOLUME II: STUDY OF
DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS RELATING TO TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 80 (Comm. Print 2000),

availableat http://www.house.gov/jct/s- I-00vol2.pdf. (last visited (Feb. 13, 2007)
69.

Strom, supra note 1.

70. See Brody, supra note 51, at 1431 ("[A]ttomeys general rarely pursue their rights
[against charities] with the same zeal that private parties exhibit."); Hansmann, supra note 8, at 873-
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deed, a "former IRS Commissioner [recently] observed that the IRS had

fewer resources than ever before with which to monitor nonprofit returns."'"
In fact, the IRS has only 800 agents to monitor 1.6 million tax-exempt organizations.72
A second major factor in the lack of effective governmental enforcement
is the narrow scope of interest of, and inadequate remedies available to,
regulators. State attorneys general tend to focus their limited enforcement

efforts upon nonprofit asset protection." As Professor Dana Brakman Reiser
recently illustrated, this focus on nonprofit financial accountability, while
laudable in many respects, fails to address other pressing issues facing nonprofit corporations, namely, mission accountability (i.e., the shifting from
charitable purpose x to charitable purpose y) and organizational accountabil-

ity (i.e., the ability of the nonprofit to function formally as a corporation).74

Many serious fiduciary violations simply fail to pique the interest of state
attorneys general.75 In addition to this narrow focus, enforcement agencies
have traditionally been saddled with inadequate enforcement tools. For example, until the last decade, revocation of tax-exempt status was the only
enforcement tool available to the IRS to regulate 501(c)(3) public charities
and to enforce the private inurement doctrine. 76 Because this draconian penalty was its lone option, the IRS rarely sanctioned wayward organizations
77
except in the most egregious cases.
Given these systemic barriers to effective nonprofit board governance
and to the oversight of nonprofit boards both by private and public actors, it
is little wonder that Professor Marion Freemont-Smith observes in the
74 ("[In most states neither the office of the attorney general nor any other office of the state government devotes any appreciable amount of resources to the oversight of nonprofit firms.");
Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1310 ("[A]ttomeys general have limited time and resources, and ...
with their other significant duties to the public, monitoring charities often ranks low on their lists of
priorities.").
71.

Silber, supra note 55, at 614.

72.

Strom, supra note 1.

73.

Brakman Reiser, supra note 8,at 208.

74. Id. passim. Some states, however, do attempt to regulate "mission accountability" at least
in limited circumstances. See H.B. 1408, 2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (N.H. 2004) ("Every health care
charitable trust shall ... conduct a community needs assessment to assist in determining the activities to be included in its community benefits plan ...[which shall] identif[y] and prioritiz[e] ...
community needs that the health care charitable trust can address directly, or in collaboration with
others.").
75. This is not to say that the recent nonprofit scandals have not stirred attorneys general to
step up their enforcement role, but the reaction has received mixed responses from scholars. See,
e.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 207 (noting the mixed reception); Mark Sidel, Law, Philanthropy and Social Class: Variance Power and the Battle for American Giving, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1145, 1151 (2003) (expressing concern for political pitfalls in enforcement).
76.

FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 16, at 495.

77. Id. With the introduction of "intermediate sanctions," the Service may now penalize
nonprofit officers and directors in their personal capacity for reaping excess benefits from transactions with their nonprofit organizations and, for more egregious violations, impose an excise tax on
the organization. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2000); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS: A GUIDE FOR NONPROFITS (2003) (providing a thorough review of Intermediate Sanctions).
As a result, the Service has stepped up its enforcement efforts.
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opening to her treatise on nonprofit organizations that "[a] distinguishing
feature of the nonprofit sector is the freedom within which its component
entities are allowed to operate. 78
II.

STATE REFORMS FOR NONPROFITS-SARBANES-OXLEY-STYLE

The coupling of ineffective governance regimes with recent nonprofit
scandals led the nonprofit community, almost from the moment the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, to push for voluntary adoption of many of
the applicable provisions of the Act.79 Seeing voluntary adoption as insufficient, however, numerous states have passed or considered legislation that
mandates Sarbanes-Oxley-like disclosure, governance, and auditing re-

quirements. s0 This Part briefly reviews the sweeping Sarbanes-Oxley-style
reforms proposed in New York and Massachusetts (which are the most aggressive Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired nonprofit reforms introduced to date)
and the more limited-but enacted-reforms from California, Connecticut,

Kansas, Maine, and New Hampshire.
A. Disclosure Reforms

Following the model of Sarbanes-Oxley, recent nonprofit legislation has
focused on enhanced disclosure of financial data as the key element of regulatory reform. Certification of financial statements by top corporate officers
is one of the most widely publicized of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms."' This
requirement mandates that officers of corporations subject to the Act sign
their financial reports as a means of certifying the accuracy of the data and
the soundness of the methodology used to obtain the data.8 2 This certification process is also a key disclosure feature of many recent, SarbanesOxley-like nonprofit reforms. One version of the New York bill, for example, employed almost identical language to that found in Sarbanes-Oxley. It
required top managers of nonprofit organizations with more than $1 million
78.

FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 2, at 1.

79. See, e.g., Jeannie C. Frey, Duties and Rules of Nonprofit Corporation Directors in Today's Environment: Has Sarbanes-Oxley Changed Anything, http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
Thomas Silk, Ten
corporateresponsibility/clearinghouse/03spring/24/protecting-directors.pdf;
Emerging Principles of Governance of Nonprofit Corporations, 43 EXEMPr ORG. TAX REV. 35
(2004) (outlining principles of good nonprofit governance post Sarbanes-Oxley); Szymanski, supra
note 32, at 1305 ("Even if [state] reforms do not come to pass, it can nonetheless be expected that
there will be pressure on nonprofit institutions to borrow some of the principles of good governance
espoused by the Act for their own purposes."); BoardSource & Independent Sector, The SarbanesOxley Act and Implications for Nonprofit Organizations, http://www.guidestar.org/news/features/
sarbanes oxley.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
80. Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1312; see Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 560-61, 567,
573; Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 208-09, at 268.
81. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate
Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1200 (2003) (reviewing this requirement and noting its wide
notoriety).
82. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a)(1)-(3), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. 1 2003)).
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in annual revenues (or $3 million in assets) to verify both the soundness of
the data in mandated internal financial reports and the reliability of procedures used to obtain the data, and to disclose any deficiencies in these
controls and any relevant frauds.83 Under this New York proposal, nonprofit
organizations with smaller annual revenues would be subject to a less rigorous verification regime.8 Proposed Massachusetts legislation also relies
upon executive certification. Under the Massachusetts approach, nonprofit
officers would make certifications similar to those required by the New York
bill in regard to annual fiscal reports due to the attorney general.85 Again,
like the New York bill, the Massachusetts bill would offer a less demanding
certification regime for nonprofit organizations with less than $500,000 in
annual revenues.

86

Several states have actually enacted Sarbanes-Oxley-like disclosure reforms. Connecticut, for instance, requires nonprofit organizations with over
$200,000 in annual revenues (excluding government grants) to submit to the
attorney general annual, audited financial statements signed by two officers
who attest to the veracity of the information.87 Kansas law, like the proposed
Massachusetts bill, now requires annual financial statements signed by two
officers from all nonprofit organizations, and requires that these statements
be audited if the organization has over $500,000 in annual revenues."
Maine, taking a tougher stance, requires signed or swornS audited
financial
• 89
statements from all but the smallest nonprofit organizations. Other states
have adopted disclosure regimes without requiring officer certification. New
Hampshire, for instance, has adopted a system wherein larger nonprofits,
based on annual revenues, must submit annual financial statements to the
attorney general. 90 Finally, in California, nonprofit organizations with annual
gross revenues of $2 million or more must make audited financial statements available to the attorney general and the public. 9' In sum, the
disclosure-focused approach adopted in Sarbanes-Oxley has had a strong

83.
Compare S.B. 4836-B, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. § l(e)(l)-(4) (N.Y. 2004), with SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 § 302(2)-(3); see also Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 251 (discussing the
similarity between the New York proposal and Sarbanes-Oxley in detail). The latest nonprofit reforms put forward by the New York Attorney General have omitted certification requirements.
Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 571.
84.

S.B. 4836-B, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. § 1(d) (N.Y. 2004).

85. Mass. A.G. Proposal, supra note 10, § 3(g) (adopting Sarbanes-Oxley-like certification
requirements with a two-tiered level of certification that, like New York's bill, requires a more vigorous level of certifications from officers of nonprofits with larger annual revenues).
86.

Id.

87.

CONN. GEN. STAT.

88.

KAN. STAT. ANN. §

§§

21a-190b, 21a-190c (Supp. 2006).

17-1763(b)(15), (c) (Supp. 2005).

89. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 5004(3), (4)(C)(1), (4)(D)(1). Section 5006(I)(D) exempts organizations with less than $10,000 in revenue from these requirements. Id.
90.

N.H.

REV. STAT. ANN.

91.

CAL.

Gov'T

CODE

§ 7.28(III-a) to (III-b) (Supp. 2005).

§ 12586(e)(1) (West 2005).
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appeal for state-based nonprofit reforms, constituting the bulk of the recent
initiatives.92
B. GovernanceReforms

Sarbanes-Oxley also imposes a series of governance reforms that have
spawned similar initiatives in the nonprofit community. The Act mandates
that publicly traded corporations form audit committees, 3 that directors who
sit on these audit committees be independent9 4 (i.e., they may not receive
extra benefits for serving on the committee and they may not be officers of
the corporation),95 and that at least one member of the audit committee be a
financial expert. 96 The Act also tasks audit committees with new responsibilities. 97 Beyond structural board issues, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits publicly
traded corporations from making personal loans to directors or top officers, 98
and the Act envisions the adoption of a financial officer's code of ethics. 99
Many states have enacted, or are considering, similar reforms for nonprofit organizations. While audit committees have been a required feature of
for-profit board governance in publicly traded companies since 1999, they
have not been a prominent component of nonprofit governance. °° The
recent Sarbanes-Oxley-style nonprofit reforms change this landscape. In

California, nonprofit corporations with more than $2 million in gross annual
revenues must establish an audit committee composed of independent members who, in accordance with Sarbanes-Oxley, may not be employees of the
corporation or receive additional compensation for service on the audit
committee.' ° ' Additionally, under California law, nonprofit corporation audit
92.

See, e.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, passim.

93. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 205(a), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a) (Supp. m 2003)) (requiring either the adoption of an audit committee or that the
functions of the audit committee be performed by the board as a whole).
94.

Id. § 301.

95. Id. ("In order to be considered to be independent ... a member of an audit committee of
an issuer may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of
directors, or any other board committee-(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory
fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.").
96. Id. § 407 ("[Ejach issuer [must] ... disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial expert
97.

Id. §§ 202, 204.

98.

Id. § 402(a).

99. Id. § 406 (requiring the SEC to issue disclosure rules regarding whether or not covered
corporations have adopted said ethical codes, and if not, why not).
100. See New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual, http://www.nyse.com/
Frameset.html?nyseref=&displayPage=/listed/1022221393251.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007)
(providing that listed companies must have audit committees in compliance with SEC rules in Section 303A.06); National Association of Securities Dealers, Bylaws of The National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., art. IX, § 5,, http://nasd.complinet.com/nasdldisplay/display.html?rbid=
1189&elementid=l 159000085 (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
101.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12586(e)(2) (West 2005). The Act allows for non-director members
of the audit committee but excludes "members of the staff, including the president or chief executive
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committees are charged with responsibilities very similar to those imposed

under Sarbanes-Oxley, such as hiring CPAs, reviewing and accepting audit
reports, and approving nonaudit services offered by accounting firms.,0 2 Under the New York bill, similar Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms would be
imposed. Nonprofit corporations with $1 million in annual revenues or $3
million in assets would be required to establish audit committees'

3

com-

members'4 with

duties similar to those imposed in
posed of independent
California. The proposed Massachusetts bill would impose similar requirements for nonprofit corporations with $750,000 in annual revenues.'°5
The states have added some governance reforms different from those
found in Sarbanes-Oxley as well. The California Nonprofit Integrity Act, for
instance, requires boards to review and approve CEO and CFO compensation to ensure it is just and reasonable.' ° Under the New York bill, large
nonprofit boards would be required to form executive committees.'°7 Moreover, many states have been ahead of Sarbanes-Oxley in terms of
prohibiting loans to officers and directors.' 8
officer and the treasurer or chief financial officer." Id. Further, "[ilf the corporation has a finance
committee, it must be separate from the audit committee ....and members of the finance committee shall constitute less than one-half of the membership of the audit committee." Id. Finally,
"[mlembers of the audit committee shall not receive any compensation from the corporation in
excess of the compensation, if any, received by members of the board of directors for service on the
board and shall not have a material financial interest in any entity doing business with the corporation." Id. This definition of independence closely follows the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 § 301 (audit committee members may not "(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or
other compensatory fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary
thereof.").
102. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12586(e)(2) (West 2005) (making the audit committee
responsible for the following: recommending the hiring and firing of CPAs and negotiating their
compensation, conferring with the auditor to ensure that the nonprofit's financial affairs are in order,
reviewing and accepting the audit, approving any non-audit services offered by the CPA's accounting firm subject to the U.S. Comptroller's Yellow Book), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
§ 202(a)(1) (requiring audit committees to preapprove all auditing and non-auditing services), id.
§ 204 (requiring audit committees to review the reports of auditors), id. § 301 (holding audit committees "directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any
registered public accounting firm").
103. S.B. 4836-B § 4(g)(1), 2004 Leg., 227th Leg. (N.Y. 2004). As Sarbanes-Oxley requires,
see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 205(a), if a nonprofit corporation does not form an audit committee, the entire board becomes charged with these duties. S.B. 4836 § 4(g)(2), 2003 Leg., 227th Sess.
(N.Y. 2003).
104. N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 4(g)(3)(A). To qualify as independent, directors may not "accept any
consulting fee, advisory fee, or other compensation or other benefits from the corporation," except
compensation received as a member of the board or its committees, id. § 4(g)(3), or have engaged in
an interested transaction with the corporation within the last year, id. § 4(g)(3)(B).
105. Mass. A.G. Proposal, supra note 10, § 8P (closely following the New York bill). New
Hampshire's act does not require audit committees. H.B. 1408, 2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (N.H. 2004).
106. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12586(g). The requirement of reasonable pay for nonprofit managers is also required under the I.R.C. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2000). Sarbanes-Oxley itself does not speak
directly to concepts such as just and reasonable compensation, but it does deal with executive compensation in many other respects. E.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304 (prohibiting certain types
of executive bonuses).
107.

N.Y. S.B. 4836-B.

108.

E.g., CAL.

N.H. REV. STAT.

CORP. CODE

ANN.

§ 5236 (requiring that loans be approved by the attorney general);

§ 7:19-a (2003) (prohibiting loans); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT

CORP. LAW

§ 716

1996
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C. Auditing Reforms

Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley requires a host of auditing reforms.' 9 Once
again, recent nonprofit reform proposals were inspired by Sarbanes-Oxley."
Many nonprofits, however, do not share the same level of auditing sophistication that one expects of publicly traded companies."' Thus, state
proposals for nonprofits tend to focus simply on requiring audited financial
statements. This is the case for nonprofit organizations that meet minimum
annual revenues under the California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine and New
Hampshire legislation." 2
III. DUBIOUS

EFFICACY OF DISCLOSURE

As noted above, the Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms closely
mimic the disclosure, governance, and auditing reforms designed for forprofit organizations. Most nonprofit law scholars contend, however, that
reflexive, wholesale importation of for-profit regulatory regimes into the
nonprofit community is ill advised."' The Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit
reforms have received a similar reception. Commentators have argued
that these acts would be too costly, disincentivize donations, and make it

(2005) (prohibiting loans); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.32 (1987) (prohibiting
loans). The majority of states still allow 501(c)(3) public charities (private foundations are prohibited from making such loans under the I.R.C.) to make loans to directors and officers, which
continues to be seen as a problem in the nonprofit community. Harvy Lipman & Grant Williams,
Assets on Loan: Nonprofit groups lend millions to officials, Chronicle study finds, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 5, 2005, at 1 (reporting that between 1998 and 2001, 501(c)(3) charitable
organizations made $142 million in personal loans to top officers).
109.

E.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101-209.

110.

See Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 573.

111.

Id.

112. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12586(e)(1) (requiring audits for organizations with more than $2
million in revenue); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 5004(4)(d)(1), 5006 (2005) (requiring audits for
organizations with more than $10,000 in annual revenues); S.B. 946, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan 2005
Sess. (Conn. 2005) (requiring audits for organizations with more than $200,000 in annual revenues);
S.B. 121, 2005 Leg., 2004-2005 Sess. (Kan. 2005) (requiring audits for organizations with more
than $500,000 in annual revenues); H.B. 1408, 2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (N.H. 2004) (requiring audits
for organizations with more than $1 million in revenue). New York and Massachusetts required
auditing under certain circumstances prior to the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 12 § 8F (LexisNexis 2000); N.Y EXEC. LAW § 172-b(1), (2).
113.
E.g., Jeffrey A. Alexander & Bryan J. Weiner, The Adoption of the Corporate Governance Model by Nonprofit Organizations, 8 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 223, 223 (1998)
("[T]he adoption of structures and practices from the for-profit sector is neither a feasible nor even a
desirable solution to problems facing many nonprofit organizations."); Michael C. Hone, Aristotle
and Lyndon Baines Johnson: Thirteen Ways of Looking at Blackbirdsand Nonprofit CorporationsThe American Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 39 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 751, 759 (1989) ("[N]onprofit laws are the poor stepchild of the state business statutes.");
Manne, supra note 25, at 229 ("[S]traight application of for-profit corporate fiduciary law would be
unsuitable."); Howard L. Oleck, Mixtures of Profit and Nonprofit Corporation Purposesand Operations, 16 N. Ky. L. REV. 225, 243 (1989) (arguing that development of the Nonprofit Model Act by
the ABA's business section is inappropriate "because that section is the wrong one for planning law
for altruistic, voluntaristic, pro bonD organizations.").
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more difficult to attract qualified directors. ' 4 In addition to such costs,
others have noted that these reforms are often duplicative and fail to
focus upon nonprofit-specific issues of corporate governance such as
mission creep and organizational unaccountability."' While the
Sarbanes-Oxley-style governance and auditing reforms may bear fruit, as
discussed below, ' 6 this Part contends that the disclosure-focused reforms
that form the bulk of these state initiatives will not assist in fostering
improved nonprofit governance. We lack institutions in the nonprofit
sector that would make use of such mandated information and legal
compliance schemes seldom inspire moral conduct without concomitant
shifts in organizational culture.
A. Mandatory Disclosures Unlikely to Be Used

As currently situated, it appears doubtful that increased disclosure of financial data will foster stronger governmental oversight of nonprofit
governance. First, as noted above, state nonprofit regulators are significantly
underfunded given the scope of their regulatory mission.'17 Yet none of the
states' Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms come with increased funding for state
attorneys general. ' Without funding, these disclosure documents seem
fated to languish in the basements of state attorneys generals' offices. Second, historically most government nonprofit enforcement efforts have been
initiated by affiliates of the nonprofit, or by investigative journalists." 9 Nevertheless, these disclosure-focused acts do not protect such whistleblowers,
who are already protected under Sarbanes-Oxley itself.2 Nor does journalistic access to this newly disclosed information, given the information
already accessible online, appear worth the cost of providing it. Finally, because there is not a market-based regulatory system to act as a buffer to
prevent the capture of state attorneys general by politically powerful nonprofit actors, even increased activity by attorneys general may be
unhelpful.'2'

114.

Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1316-20.

115.

See e.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 561; Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 208.

116.

See infra notes 186-194 and accompanying text.

117.

See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.

See e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17510.5; CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12581-12599.7;
§ 21a-190b to 190c, 190f, 190h (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. 17-1763, -6002
(2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5003-5005, 5007-5009, 5011-5012,5017-5018; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7:28, :32-f (2004).
119. Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 953 & n.60 (2004).
118.

CONN. GEN. STAT.

120. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. III 2003)).
121.

See, e.g., Mark Sidel, The Nonprofit Sector and the New State Activism, 100

MICH.

L.

REV. 1312, 1334-35 (2002) (reviewing NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE
EMERGENCE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (2001)) (providing this "capture" argument).
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It is also doubtful that donors or other members of the public will make
use of greater mandatory disclosure of financial data. One assumption underlying these legislative efforts appears to be that donors will use this
information when making gifts. Empirical studies, however, do not support
this assumption. The data shows that small donations made by individuals
are the backbone of the nonprofit sector. Donations by individuals account
for 76.5% of all nonprofit contributions.' The majority of these individually donated funds are given by households earning less than $100,000
annually." Based on 2003 tax returns, the median amount given to nonprofit organizations per household is $700 annually. 24 While reliable data is
not• available,
the median donation per charity may be close to $100 per
25
gift. Thus, the median household likely engages in seven $100 gift transactions annually. Perhaps as a result of the relatively small scale of these
transactions, most donors do not investigate the financial or governance

practices of nonprofit organizations before donating.2 2 Large donors will not

benefit from a strengthened, mandatory financial disclosure regime either.
Nonprofits that seek to obtain large grants must provide the grantors with all
the information the grantor desires, which is accomplished without legally

imposed transparency rules. Federally funded nonprofit organizations, for
example, must provide significant amounts of financial documentation to

supra note 15, at 14.

122.

GIVING

123.

Id. at 2 (based on 2003 tax returns).

USA

FOUND.,

124. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., AVERAGE AND MEDIAN AMOUNTS OF HOUSEHOLD GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN 2002 FROM THE CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY PANEL STUDY
(COPPS) 2003 WAVE (March 2006), http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/Average%20AmountsHousehold%20Giving%20&%20Volunteering-2002.pdf. (last visited ) The average amount given
was $1,872, but this figure is greatly increased by a small number of huge gifts at the top end.
125. This is a difficult statistic to establish. Most data regarding donations to charities comes
from two sources: (1) IRS itemized tax returns, and (2) the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study
(COPPS) (which is attached to the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamic).
Neither data set includes information regarding per charity donations. Letter from Patrick M.
Rooney, Professor of Economics and Philanthropic Studies and Director of Research for The Center
on Philanthropy at Indiana University (Sept. 6, 2006) (on file with author). As a crude proxy for the
median donation per charity, I am relying upon the median donation to the United Way in 2003,
which was approximately $100. United Way, Non-Itemized Deduction Would Substantially Boost
Charitable Giving, http://national.unitedway.org/news/statements/Non-itemized%20Flyerl.pdf. As
the United Way is a top-five charity when measured either by revenues or by assets, this
organization was picked to provide a crude proxy of per charity giving across the nation.
William P. Barrett, the 200 Largest U.S. Charities, http://www.forbes.com/2005/11/18/
largest-charities-ratings.05charitiesland.html (follow "Revenues" hyperlink for revenue rankings;
follow "Net Assets" hyperlink for net asset rankings) (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). The key point, I
hope, is not lost here. The median family engages in several relatively modest gift transactions totaling $700 per annum.
126. E.g., Katie Cunningham & Marc Ricks, Why Measure?, STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REV.,
Summer 2004, at 44 (finding donor interest in financial accountability negligible); William F
Meehan HI et al., Investing in Society, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. Spring 2004, at 34, 35-36
(reviewing studies that find that donors do not investigate the financial and governance practices of
organizations before donating).
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the federal government,

27

1999

as do recipients of funds from private grant-

making institutions.
B. Disclosureas an Instrumental Value

These many failures illuminate broader insights about disclosure as a
tool of corporate governance. At least since future Supreme Court Justice

Louis Brandeis wrote his groundbreaking book in 1914, 29 disclosure has
come to be seen as a preeminent value of corporate governance amongst
30131
132
public intellectuals, 3 business ethicists, legal academics, and within the
nonprofit community.'33 This high regard for transparency has a venerable
philosophical lineage that reaches back to the pantheon of Western political

127. E.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-110,
UNIFORM ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR GRANTS AND AGREEMENTS WITH INSTITUTIONS OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, HOSPITALS, AND OTHER NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 51-53 (1999),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/al 10/al 10.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
In light of these requirements, the California Nonprofit Integrity Act, for example, exempts nonprofits funded by government grants from its requirements. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12583 (West 2004).
Further, hospitals, educational institutions and religious organizations are not subject to the Act as
these sectors are already heavily regulated under other bodies of law. Id.
128.

E.g., Paul N. Ylvisaker, Foundations and Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT

SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 360, 365 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).

129. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)
("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.").
130. See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & DAVID TICOLL, THE NAKED CORPORATION 62-93 (2003)
(arguing that transparency is, in effect, a panacea to cure all corporate ills).
131.
See, e.g., David S. Gelb & Joyce A. Strawser, CorporateSocial Responsibility and Financial Disclosures: An Alternative Explanation for Increased Disclosure, 33 J. Bus. ETHICS 1
(2001) (arguing that disclosure regimes are valuable even though empirical data does not suggest
that such regimes have any financial benefits); Eleanor R. E. O'Higgins, Corruption, Underdevelopment, and Extractive Resource Industries:Addressing the Vicious Cycle, 16 Bus. ETHICS Q. 235
(2006) (contending that increased transparency by transnational corporations will assist in the reduction of international corporate corruption in the mineral extraction industry).
132. Matthew F. Gorra, On-Line Trading and United States Securities Policy: Evaluating the
SEC's Role in InternationalSecurities Regulation, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 209, 210 n.4 (1998) ("By
imposing anti-fraud and disclosure requirements ... the Commission preserves marketwide transparency and, hence, fosters efficient domestic securities markets"); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen

O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective,
28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 31 (1999) ("[The SEC] has long believed that transparency ... plays a fundamental role in the fairness and efficiency of the secondary markets ...

and improves the price

discovery, fairness, competitiveness and attractiveness of U.S. markets." (quoting UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS, IV-1 (1994), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreglmarket2OOO.pdf));
Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and Future
Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044, 1044 (2005) ("The fundamental goal of securities law is to make
markets more efficient by providing transparency to investors, thereby reducing asymmetric information.").

133. See, e.g., Mordecai Lee, Public Reporting: A Neglected Aspect of Nonprofit Accountability, 15 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 169 (2004) (arguing that nonprofits should adopt a
scheme of public reporting as one method to increase citizen confidence in their activities and in the

sector as a whole).
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thought."' Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to make a fetish of disclo-

sure. It is clich6 nowadays to state that having vast amounts of data without
the resources to intelligently review and employ it is of no value, but that
does not detract from the veracity of this insight as it relates to corporate
disclosure regimes.'35 This insight suggests, then, that disclosure is only of
instrumental value. That is to say, corporate disclosure, either in the forprofit or nonprofit sector, is normatively valuable only when institutions are
established, or soon will be established, that enable interested parties to

make use of the data to further some other ends (e.g., improved financial
returns, improved environmental performance, or improved human rights
enforcement).

It follows that disclosure regimes not coupled with public

or private institutions that enable interested parties to make use of the information are normatively valueless. 137 But this is exactly what the SarbanesOxley-inspired nonprofit regimes intend to impose.
Of course, the availability of more financial information as envisioned
by the Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms could change the donative

environment. Indeed, some have suggested it is a lack of easily accessible
data that causes this dearth of interest in nonprofit financial practices and

that donors would review the data if it were readily available."' This view
134.

See, e.g.,

IMMANUEL KANT,

JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS

Eternal Peace. in THE

PHILOSOPHY OF

29-44 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999);

KANT 470 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949); JOHN

STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 262 (H.B. Action ed., 1972); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 16, 454 (1971); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Dedication to the Republic
of Geneva, in DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 32-33 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1988).

135. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 781, 787 (2001) (describing how corporate disclosure partially works in
the United States "through a complex set of laws and private and public institutions that give investors reasonable assurance that the issuer is being (mostly) truthful,"); Nicole Dando & Tracey Swift,
Transparency and Assurance: Minding the Credibility Gap, 44 J. Bus. ETHICS 195 (2003) (arguing
that increasing levels of disclosure of social, ethical and environmental performance by corporations
and other organizations is not being accompanied by simultaneous greater levels of public trust and
that a common metric for deciphering this data is needed to enhance the value of disclosures);
Miriam Miquelon Weismann, Corporate Transparency or Congressional Window-Dressing? The
Case Against Sarbanes-Oxley as a Means to Avoid Another Corporate Debacle: The Failed Attempt
to Revive Meaningful Regulatory Oversight, 10 STAN. J.L. BUs. & FIN. 98 (2004) (contending that
Congress's goal of increasing corporate transparency by passing Sarbanes-Oxley is pointless because it is not coupled with effective SEC regulatory reform).
136.
I am using the term institution quite broadly to include informal social practices or market forces. That is, I would label wide-spread, individual, unorganized, accessing of Form 990
filings by the public as an institution that makes use of disclosed data.
137.
Of course, corporate disclosure might be inherently valuable--that is to say, corporate
transparency might be normatively valuable regardless of the consequence that flows from such
disclosures. See James J. Brummer, Accountability and the Restraint of Freedom: A Deontological
Case for the Stricter Standard of Corporate Disclosure, 5 J. Bus. ETHICS 155 (1986) (arguing, from
a Kantian point of view, that corporate transparency is a good per se). A full refutation of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article, but I would ask the reader to engage in the following
thought experiment: To be inherently valuable, one would have to agree that corporate transparency
has normative force even in an environment where no one could make use of the information. While
it is possible that this could be valued as adding authenticity to business endeavors or somehow
recognizes the value of other moral agents, I find the concept of corporate transparency as inherently
valuable untenable.
138.
David Bornstein, Let's Make Sure Worthy Groups Get Aid, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan.
22, 2004, at 37 (offering this opinion).
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strikes a sour note, however. First, as outlined above, vast amounts of nonprofit financial information is already available to the public online.' Yet
the majority of individual donors do not reference this material. There is
little reason to think that adding more data to the public sphere will change
that attitude. Indeed, increasing publicly available data may have the oppo-

site effect because donors may reach a point of information overload and
fail to make use of new data.

4

This problem would appear all the more

pressing in the nonprofit sector because it4 lacks a well-developed market of
financial experts to filter data for donors. '

C. Compliance Focused
The Sarbanes-Oxley-like disclosure reforms also suffer from an overly legalistic approach to ethical governance. Sarbanes-Oxley, and nonprofit

reforms modeled upon it, by and large take a compliance approach to the production of ethical board governance. 42 These reforms are premised upon the
belief that forcing nonprofit leaders to produce certain documents will lead to
superior behavior in the future. The empirical data we have suggests that the
mere production of compliance documents or ethics codes, without a concomitant change in the "ethical climate" in the organization, will not result in
improved ethical behavior. 43 Disclosure regimes that lack effective review by

donors, government, or other market-based forces, such as those created under
the Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms, are unlikely to foster such a change in the

ethical climate of wayward nonprofit organizations.'" Such legalistic regimes,
instead of inspiring a renewed sense of ethical obligation, may lead to a preoccupation with fulfilling mandated processes and the loss of freedom to
make innovative decisions required by an ethically sound organization. 45 In
light of this overwhelming evidence, one participant in this symposium
139.

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

140. E.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003) (arguing that greater disclosure lacks
value without improved means of using the information by for-profit investors and experts because
the average investor experiences "information overload").
141. Cf id. at 432 ("As a practical matter, a company's disclosures are largely 'filtered'
through experts-various securities professionals and financial intermediaries-who research and
process the information and whose trades and recommendations ultimately set securities prices.").
142. Surendra Arjoon, Corporate Governance:An EthicalPerspective, 61 J. Bus. ETHICS 343,
345 (2005).
143. See generally Mark S. Schwartz, Effective Corporate Codes of Ethics: Perceptions of
Code Users, 55 J. Bus. ETHICS 323 (2004); Mark S. Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship between CorporateCodes of Ethics and Behaviour, 32 J. Bus. ETHICS 247 (2001); Linda Trevino et
al., The Ethical Context in Organizations:Influences on Employee Attitudes and Behaviors, 8 Bus.
ETHICS Q. 447 (1998); Linda Trevino et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works
and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131 (1999); Linda K. Trevino & Gary R. Weaver, Organizational Justice and Ethics Program "Follow-Through": Influences on Employees' Harmful and
Helpful Behavior, II Bus. ETHICS Q. 651 (2001).
144.

E.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 583-87.

145. William H. Donaldson, Corporate Governance: What Has Happened and Where We
Need To Go, Bus. EcON., July 2003, at 16, 18.
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contends that standard legalistic approaches to corporate governance are "con-

stitutionally incapable of producing socially responsible corporations in this
current age of complexity and value pluralism ....[because] corporations are
not being encouraged to develop new solutions to existing (or potential) problems, but only to meet a certain minimum level of behavior."' 46 Such damning
critiques appear all the worse in the nonprofit context. Because they are not
accompanied by either increased funding for state regulators or an efficient
non-governmental regulatory regime for nonprofits, 4 1 Sarbanes-Oxleyinspired reforms will impose the large costs of disclosure and verification pro-

cedures onto nonprofit organizations 4 1 without any realistic hope that these
rules will act as a deterrent.
IV. MISTAKEN

MORAL PREMISE

Assuming these many critiques of the recent Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms are sound, they beg the question: How have so many legislative
proposals gone awry? This Part argues that these legislative proposals start

with an ethical framework that is inapplicable in the nonprofit context. Sarbanes-Oxley posits a stockholder conception of business ethics, yet
nonprofit corporations are quintessentially stakeholder organizations. Because nonprofit organizations have no stockholders to protect, the SarbanesOxley-like nonprofit reforms are mislaid. I contend that, with a clearer un-

derstanding of the appropriate ethical regime in which nonprofit
corporations operate, future effective nonprofit reforms will be more easily
crafted.
A. Nonprofit Corporationsand Stakeholder Theory
Scholars of organizational ethics have formulated numerous theories regarding the moral dimensions of business endeavors. Two of the leading normative
theories 149 of business ethics that are particularly relevant here are stockholder

146. David Hess, Regulating CorporateSocial Performance:A New Look at Social Accounting, Auditing, and Reporting, 11 Bus. ETHICS Q. 307, 310 (2001).
147. Cf Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 671, 675-76 (2002)
(describing, in the for-profit context, how strict rules work as deterrents only if there is some belief
that they will be enforced).
148. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. Rav. 71, 117 (2002) (discussing disclosure in the forprofit sector and noting that "[mionitoring-based systems have unexpectedly serious (and probably
immeasurable) costs, which society should not impose without strong reason.").
149. The following families of theories are often used in reference to descriptive claims, instrumental claims, and normative claims of business organizations. For example, stakeholder theory
is often used in reference to all three types of assertions. See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston,
The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD.
MGMT. REV.65, 69-73 (1995). There is a similar dual empirical and normative use in the literature
of stockholder (or agency) theory. See Norman E. Bowie & R. Edward Freeman, Ethics and Agency
Theory: An Introduction, in ETHICS AND AGENCY THEORY 3, 3-4 (Norman E. Bowie & R. Edward
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theory and stakeholder theory 5 ° From the stockholder theory perspective,

corporations are merely arrangements by which investors advance funds to
managers in return for an equity interest in the venture. 5' Under this view,
directors and officers are agents of the stockholders and are bound as fiduciaries to pursue only the ends established by the stockholders."' Milton

Friedman, often portrayed as a standard bearer for this view, sums up the corporation's moral duties well: "The social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits ...[constrained by law and] ethical custom."'53 It is worth
noting, as Friedman makes clear, that stockholder theory does not condone the

pursuit of stockholder value by any means without moral constraints, as some
detractors imply, but rather the pursuit of stockholder value via normatively

pennissible means' 54 While some commentators remain proponents of

Freeman eds., 1992). Inthis Article, unless I specifically so delineate, I will use these terms to refer
only to normative claims.
150. See John Hasnas, The Normative Theories of Business Ethics:A Guidefor the Perplexed,
8 Bus. ETHICS Q. 19 (1998). Hasnas also identifies a third leading family of theories, namely, social
contract theory. This family of normative business values is of great importance in current business
ethics scholarship. See, e.g., THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND (1999);
Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics, 19
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252 (1994). The root idea expounded upon by Donaldson and Dunfee is that
normative duties for business entities may be established via the integration of a set of hypernorms-formulated in a Rawlsian manner-with extant contracts (including implied contracts)
between members of specific economic communities. A full discussion of Integrative Social Contract Theory, as it is styled, is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, the work of social
contract theorists such as Donaldson and Dunfee is an attempt to outline normative duties owed by
business entities to persons beyond stockholders. As such, most, if not all, of the following discussion of the inapplicability of stockholder theory to nonprofits-and thus the applicability of
stakeholder theory-could very well be reconstituted in terms of social contract theory. Finally, this
focus on normative duties of business entities themselves in this Article is not to say that business
ethicists do not discuss other families of normative theories as well, most notably virtue ethics. See
Robert C. Solomon, Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business, 13 Bus.
ETHICS Q. 43 (2003). Virtue ethics, however, is more focused on the character of individuals than on
the normative duties of organizations themselves. As such, this family of theories will not be a focus
in this Article.
151.

Hasnas, supra note 150, at 24.

152.

Id.

153. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970) (Magazine), reprinted in BUSINESS ETHICS 153, 153 (W. Michael Hoffman
and Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) ("[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the
game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.").
154.

Hasnas, supra note 150, at 22.
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stockholder theory,"'
the majority of thinkers in the business-ethics field con56
sider it pass6.1
By most accounts, stakeholder theory is the preeminent contemporary
normative theory of business ethics, especially among business practitioners. 5' The basic view is that, regardless of the potential to increase returns
to investors, corporate managers morally ought to make decisions that benefit all stakeholders in the corporation, not just stockholders. 5 In short,
"[s]takeholder theory stands ... against th[e] univocal view of shareholders
iber alles [represented by stockholder theory.]'" 5 9 Stakeholders, pursuant to

this conception of business ethics, include many different people, such as
stockholders, creditors, employees, the local community, clients, and suppliers.' ° The moral imperative for corporate managers is to balance the often
competing, yet morally equal, needs and desires of this diverse set of interests. 161

155. See, e.g., John Dobson, Defending the Stockholder Model: A Comment on Hasnas,and
on Dunfee's MOM, 9 Bus. ETHICS Q. 337 (1999) (arguing that the stockholder theory allows for the
translation of ethical concerns of the public into readily identifiable market pressures to which corporate managers can react); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC

1-39 (1991) (presenting an economists perspective of stockholder
theory); Hasnas, supra note 150 (arguing that stockholder theory is capable of deontological foundations traditionally thought to be the sole domain of stakeholder theory); Alexei M. Marcoux, A
Fiduciary Argument Against Stakeholder Theory, 13 Bus. ETHICS Q. 1 (2003) (arguing that stockholder theory furthers the special moral status of investors in a business venture).
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW

156.

THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 45 (1989) (arguing that

stockholder theory is an outmoded view of business ethics); Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston,
The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 65, 81-82 (1995) (similar); William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder
Theory of the Modem Corporation:Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 75,
76-77 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 4th ed. 1993) (similar); ROBERT C. SOLOMON,
ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE 45 (1993) (similar).
157. See Kevin Gibson, The Moral Basis of Stakeholder Theory, 26 J. Bus. ETHICS 245
(2000) (noting the overwhelming dominance of stakeholder theory in scholarly writings).
158. Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, The Ethical and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder
Theory, 12 Bus. ETHICS Q. 215, 216-20 (2002) (providing overview of stakeholder theory); Hasnas,
supra note 150, at 25 (same).
159.

Orts & Strudler, supra note 158, at 216.

160. Determining who ought to be a stakeholder has been a source of much debate in the
business ethics community. See, e.g., Ronald K. Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder
Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 853, 857 (1997). Very grossly speaking, there are two camps. Many look to a narrow
view of who a stakeholder is, based upon having some asset at risk. See, e.g., Max B. E. Clarkson, A
Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance, 20 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 92, 105-07 (1995). Others seek a broader conception of stakeholder, which would
include "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization's purpose." R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 55
(1984). We need not troll the depths of these waters for the purposes of this Article.
161.

See R. Edward Freeman, Stakeholder Theory of the Modem Corporation, in ETHICAL
A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 314 (Thomas Donaldson & Patricia H. Werhane
eds., 6th ed. 1998) ("The task of management in today's corporation is akin to that of King Solomon. The stakeholder theory does not give primacy to one stakeholder group over another, though
there will surely be times when one group will benefit at the expense of others. In general, however,
management must keep the relationships among stakeholders in balance.").
ISSUES IN BUSINESS:
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As every nontrivial activity assumes a philosophical perspective, corporate governance reforms also presuppose a particular normative view, such
as a stockholder or stakeholder view. Sarbanes-Oxley is no exception. I contend that Congress employed a stockholder conception of business ethics
when it passed the Act. Congress made this clear in the Preamble, stating its
goal as "protect[ing] investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures."'' 62 Legal scholars also agree that the Act is focused
almost exclusively upon the needs of stockholders.

63

Moreover, the stock-

holder perspective exemplified in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is not
aberrational, but rather a continuation of the long-standing focus of corporate law on the protection of stockholder interest.' 64 Even if this attribution
of a stockholder normative perspective to Sarbanes-Oxley is too strong,

there can be little argument that the Act assumes that investors are far and
away the most important stakeholders in corporations either as a normative
matter 65 or for other efficiency reasons.)
This stockholder-focused normative approach adopted by SarbanesOxley-and derivatively by the nearly identical disclosure-based reforms

imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit legislation-is completely
inapposite in the nonprofit sector. Simply put, nonprofit corporations lack
stockholders and they overwhelmingly lack voting members who would
have interests similar to stockholders.167 A nonprofit reform regime based

upon a normative principle of protecting stockholders' interests is not only
inapplicable but it also violates the venerable moral principle of "ought implies can."' 68 That is to say, because nonprofits cannot protect stockholder
interests (as these stockholders do not exist), they ought not be morally

162.

See supra note 7.

163. See, e.g., Arjoon, supra note 142, at 345; Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 239;
Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1316.
164. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the ,Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1313, 1326 (1992) ("[T]he fundamental
goal of corporate law is so theoretically and historically obvious that it need not be explicated: the
goal is to maximize corporate-and thus shareholder-welfare').
165.

See, e.g., Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 1 Bus.

ETHICS Q. 53 (1991) (arguing that corporations owe special moral duties to shareholders); Kenneth
E. Goodpaster and Thomas E. Holloran, In Defense of a Paradox, 4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 423 (1994)

(same). But see John R. Boatright, FiduciaryDuties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: Or
What's So Special About Shareholders?, 4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 393 (1994) (arguing against the uniqueness of stockholder interests); R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future
Directions, 4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 409,413 (1994) (same).
166. See, e.g., Dobson, supra note 155, at 339 ("Within financial-economic theory, therefore,
the stockholder model is not praised as a normative ideal because stockholders are viewed as in any
way morally superior to other stakeholders, but rather because a focus on stockholders-or more
specifically on stock price-leads to a minimum of agency costs, which in turn benefits all stakeholders.").
167.

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.

Kant is generally credited with the first published exposition of this principle-although
in true Kantian fashion his discussion is not quite so pithy. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 149-53 (Lewis White Beck trans., 3d ed., Macmillan 1993) (1788).
168.
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obliged to do So.1 69 Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms start not
merely with an inapplicable moral premise but with an impossible moral
imperative.
Adopting a stakeholder view as an initial normative premise, by contrast, is the appropriate moral framework for nonprofit reforms. First, as a
descriptive matter, nonprofit corporations are archetypal stakeholder organizations. As discussed above,'70 nonprofit corporations lack stockholders. The
board has responsibilities to promote the nonprofit's mission and is responsible to a wide range of stakeholders, including donors, clients, employees,
and taxpayers. 171 This list of stakeholders is nearly identical to the standard
list of stakeholders of for-profit corporations.' As with stakeholders in forprofit corporations," 3 these nonprofit stakeholders have differing expectations of the nonprofit
corporation, which in turn affects the board's concept
1 74
of accountability.
Second, the normative principles that ground for-profit stakeholder theory map nearly one-to-one with standard normative principles offered for
nonprofit governance. Professors Evans and Freeman-leading proponents
of stakeholder-style for-profit corporate governance-have condensed ethical governance practices into two principles. The first axiom, the "principle
of corporate legitimacy," posits that "the corporation should be managed for
the benefit of its stakeholders: its customers, suppliers, owners, employees,
and the local communities.""' The second principle, the "stakeholder fiduciary principle," states that:
[M]anagement bears a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders and to the corporation as an abstract entity. It must act in the interests of the stakeholders
as their agent, and it must act in the interests of the corporation to ensure
the survival of the firm, safeguarding the long-term stakes of each group.116

Commentators on ethical nonprofit governance have coalesced upon.
similar principles. John Carver, for instance, argues that nonprofits should
be governed for the benefit of "the various stakeholders to whom the board
owes its primary allegiance," much like Evans and Freeman's principle of
legitimacy. 77 Professor David Smith presents another standard principle of
ethical, nonprofit board governance when he asserts that the board should be
loyal to the mission of the corporation and that directors should "attend to
169.
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the goals, values, and expectations of the larger community."'' 8 This principle is much like Evans and Freeman's stakeholder fiduciary principle' 79 and

the fiduciary duties imposed upon nonprofit directors by law.' As with forprofit stakeholder theory,'"' Smith notes that a key ethical function of the
nonprofit board is to balance the competing needs and desires of various
stakeholders.18 2 Stakeholder theory, rather than the stockholder theory upon
which the Sarbanes-Oxley-style reforms are based, is the superior rubric for
formulating and evaluating ethical nonprofit governance.
B. Stakeholder Theory and Future Nonprofit Reforms
Adopting a stakeholder approach would have a substantial effect upon

future nonprofit reforms. By focusing on the numerous hurdles that stakeholder organizations must overcome instead of reflexively imposing a forprofit reform regime, future legislation could be more effective in improving
ethical board governance.
First, future nonprofit reforms should focus less on disclosing data to

uninterested parties and more on the difficulty nonprofit corporations find in
communicating with various interested stakeholders. One means of accomplishing this goal is through the increased use of advisory boards, which
would allow nonprofit organizations to bring in larger and more diverse
stakeholder representatives without imposing the full burden of being a formal board member upon these individuals or further enlarging the board of
directors.'83
Additionally, nonprofit reforms should strive to address the accountability vacuum within which many nonprofit boards operate. Empirical data
suggests that nonprofit boards that can identify lines of accountability have
superior abilities to monitor activity by management because these boards

are able to identify performance and evaluation criteria."'As such, state
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reforms
that facilitate this process of building accountability may be wel185
come.

This is not to say that the Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms entirely miss the
normative mark. 86 The imposition of independent audit committees, for example, may go a long way toward fostering improved stakeholder-style
board governance. As noted above, a key issue confronting nonprofit board
performance revolves around poorly informed directors and their overly
supine attitudes toward management.' Further, empirical data indicates that

large board size, a ubiquitous phenomenon in nonprofits, is associated with
lower levels of formal monitoring by the board. 18 In the for-profit arena,
however, "larger boards are not as susceptible to managerial domination as

their smaller counterpart .... [T]hese boards will be more actively involved
in monitoring and evaluating CEO and company performance, normally
through specialized committees."'8 9 Perhaps the imposition of small, specialized, and independent audit committees and executive committees will bring

similar results in the nonprofit context. The data suggests that more active
nonprofit board oversight can prevent the harm that managerial malfeasance
can inflict on constituents, communities, and overall organizational reputation.' 90Finally, structural reforms such as the imposition of audit committees
lay the groundwork for ethical corporate governance, not just for a particular
metric that is measured in a disclosure form but for a wide array of issues
that may come before the board.'9 '

Of course, no reform scheme is perfect. Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, the
nonprofit reforms do not require that audit committees have financial experts as members.
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even those who are veteran businesspeople, in the dark.' 93 This opacity could
thwart any attempt at meaningful board oversight of financial matters. But
on the other hand, recruiting dedicated nonprofit directors is already a difficult enough task without the added requirement of finding a nonprofit
director with substantive knowledge of nonprofit accountancy.' 94 Thus, the
requirement that nonprofits (at least those with substantial resources) obtain
professional audits makes sense from the stakeholder perspective. Given the
specialized nature of nonprofit accounting, an audit requirement will force
nonprofit boards into obtaining a clear understanding of their organization's
financial health. All this is to show that, by adopting a stakeholder normative framework, reformers of the nonprofit sector will more likely adopt
legislation that will positively change nonprofit board governance.
CONCLUSION

An increased appreciation of the problems of nonprofit board governance, which the Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms embody, is a positive
step away from the traditional neglect of the nonprofit community by public
and private supervisory institutions. Indeed, as the nonprofit sector continues to grow, issues of board governance will become more pressing, thus
increasing the need for effective oversight institutions. Such efforts, however, should be based upon a normative perspective that is apropos to the
nonprofit sector instead of a knee-jerk application of for-profit regulatory
structures to the nonprofit sector. Unfortunately, the bulk of the recent Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms do not adopt this philosophy.
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194. See generally Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1316 ("Commentators have frequently described the difficulty many nonprofits encounter when searching for qualified directors and board
members."). The California act does allow for nondirectors to serve on the audit committee; inducing experts in nonprofit accountancy to serve may be less demanding as they need only serve in this
one capacity. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12586(e)(2) (West 2005).
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